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Abstract 
This deliverable reports on the activities for the set-up of the modelling environments for the 
evaluation activities of WP5. To this objective, it reports on the identified modelling peculiarities of 
the electric power infrastructure and the information infrastructures and of their 
interdependencies, recalls the tools that have been considered and concentrates on the tools that 
are, and will be, used in the project: DrawNET, DEEM and EPSys which have been developed 
before and during the project by the partners, and Möbius and PRISM, developed respectively at 
the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign and at the University of Birmingham (and recently 
at the University of Oxford). 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This deliverable reports on the activities carried on by the consortium to select a set of 
appropriate tools to be used (and being currently used) for the evaluation activities of WP5. 
This deliverable is organized as follows: Section 1 discusses the modelling peculiarities of 
the systems evaluated in CRUTIAL, Section 2 reports on tools used for model based 
analysis, while Section 3 reports on techniques and tools for statistical analysis of collected 
data, which allow to provide statistically realistic data to the models used for the evaluation. 
This introduction identifies the modelling peculiarities of the considered infrastructures, in 
terms of structure, complexity, propagations, and proceeds in translating these peculiarities 
into tools and formalisms requirements. The deliverable uses the following abbreviations: EI 
for Electrical Infrastructure, II for the Information Infrastructure (monitor, control and 
communication support) and EPS for Electrical Power System, the composition of the two 
infrastructures. 
1.1 Modelling peculiarities of information infrastructure II and electrical 
infrastructure EI. 
We have found a number of interesting features in our systems and in the corresponding 
models, that we discuss one by one.  
1.1.1 Hierarchical nature of the II structure 
The II system has a natural hierarchical structure. We can distinguish three main levels of 
control corresponding to different levels of criticality and locality of the decisions.  
The local II components (Local Control System - LCS) control and guarantee the correct 
operation of a substation and reconfigure the substation in case of breakdown of some 
apparatus. Therefore, their decisions can affect the single substations only (local decisions, 
with low criticality). 
The regional II components (Regional Telecontrol System – RTS) monitor the set of 
substations in their region, in order to diagnose faults on the power lines. In case of 
breakdowns, they choose the more suitable corrective actions to restore the functionality of 
the grid (regional decisions, with high criticality). Since these regional components are not 
directly connected to the substations, the corrective actions to adopt are communicated to 
the local components of reference.  
Finally, the national II component (National Telecontrol System – NTS) has the main function 
of supervising the entire grid and handling the planning of medium and long term operations. 
It also assists the regional components to localize breakdowns on the power lines situated 
between two regions (or between two areas).  
A complete description of the II structure has been provided in D2 [Donatelli 2008a], 
Donatelli et al, "Model-based evaluation of the middleware services and protocols & 
architectural patterns ", CRUTIAL project, Work Package 5, Deliverable D25, January 2008.  
[Daly et al. 2000]  D. Daly, D. D. Deavours, P. G. Webster and W. H. Sanders, “Möbius: An 
extensible tool for performance and dependability modeling”, in 11th International 
Conference, TOOLS 2000, (H. C. B. B. R. Haverkort, and C. U. Smith, Ed.), (Schaumburg, 
IL, USA), pp.332-336, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2000. 
[Franceschinis et al. 2002]  G. Franceschinis, M. Gribaudo, M. Iacono, N. Mazzocca and V. 
Vittorini, “Drawnet++: Model objects to support performance analysis and simulation of 
complex systems”, in Lecture Notes in Computer Science LNCS 2324, pp.233-238, Springer-
Verlag, 2002. 
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[Fricks et al. 1997]  R. Fricks, C. Hirel, S. Wells and K. Trivedi, “The development of an 
integrated modeling environment”, in World Congress on Systems Simulation (WCSS '97), 
(Singapore), pp.471-476, 1997. 
[German et al. 1995a]  R. German, C. Kelling, A. Zimmermann and G. Hommel, “Timenet: A 
toolkit for evaluating non-markovian stochastic petri-nets”, Performance Evaluation, 24, 
pp.69-87, 1995a. 
[Garrone et al. 2007]. 
1.1.2 Complexity of the EI structure 
The EI infrastructure is composed by a large number of components (electrical equipments), 
whose behaviours are strictly correlated each other. From a high-level point of view, EI is 
logically structured in different components: the transmission grid (TG), the distribution grid 
(DG), the high voltage generation plants (HG), the medium and low voltage generation plants 
(LG), the high voltage loads (HL) and the medium and low voltage loads (LL). 
The transmission grid and the distribution grid can be considered like a network, or a graph: 
the nodes of the graph represent the substations, while the arcs represent the power lines. 
The generators and the loads are nodes connected by arcs (power lines) to the nodes of the 
grid (the substations). Some nodes of the grid can be connected to nodes of the contiguous 
grid. 
In turn, each node is composed by a set of electrical equipments like transformers, bus-bars, 
breakers, switches, power lines and protections (see D3 [Kaâniche et al. 2007]  for more 
details). 
1.1.3 EI failures and internal propagations 
Concerning the EI failures and their propagation inside EI, we identify the following 
peculiarities:  
• The time to failures of the electrical equipments composing the EI depends on the 
component (e.g., the length of the line, the position of the station, etc.), on the value 
of the electrical parameters associated to the components (e.g., an overloaded power 
line has a lower time to failure than a non-overloaded one) and on the type of 
disruption it can be affected (lightning, tree fall, etc.).  
• An EI failure of a component can propagate to contiguous components (e.g., a 
lightning on a power line propagates through the connected substations if the 
respective protections do not open), and the propagation time should not be 
considered instantaneous.  
• Protections can stop the propagation of an EI failure by isolating the affected 
components from the grid. The activation time of a protection should not be 
considered instantaneous. The correct activation of a protection depends on its state 
(working or failed), on the strength of the disruption (e.g., the power of the lightning) 
and on the value of the electrical parameters associated to the protection component.  
1.1.4 II failures and internal propagations 
Concerning the II failures and their propagation inside II, we identify the following 
peculiarities:  
• The failures of the II components can be summarized in (transient and permanent) 
omission failure, time failure, value failure and byzantine failure. In general, the failure 
of the components LCS, RTS and NTS may depend on the failures of the 
components connected to them through a network. 
• Failures of some LCS components can impact on the input values that the 
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component RTS receives from LCSs. These values can be omitted, delayed (or 
anticipated) or erroneous. Since reconfigurations required by RTS (or NTS) are 
actuated by the associated component LCS, a failure of a component LCS can also 
impact on the reconfigurations required by RTS (or NTS). 
• The failure of the component RTS (or NTS) corresponds to an erroneous (request of) 
reconfiguration of the state of EI (including an unneeded reconfiguration) affecting 
one or more components of the controlled region. 
• The reaction time (with respect to the occurrence of an EI failure), the failure time and 
the erroneous activation time (when no EI failures have occurred) of an II component 
(e.g., LTS, RTS and NTS) should be considered.  
• The functions that implement the reconfiguration and regulation algorithms should be 
considered. These functions activate when EI is not in equilibrium; in such conditions, 
they receive as input the current topology and the electrical values associated to each 
electrical equipment, and produce as outputs a new topology with a new setting of 
electrical parameters which allows the equilibrium condition to be restored (that is, EI 
is back to the NORMAL state), if possible. 
1.1.5 II ÍÎ EI (interdependencies) 
IIÎEI - cyber interdependency: when the state of the EI infrastructure depends on 
information transmitted through the II infrastructure. 
• Failures in II impact on the state of EI depending on the components affected by the 
failures, and obviously by the type of the failures.  
• The consequences of a failure of the component LCSassociated to a substation can 
be, for example: 
o Omission failure of LCS, fail silent LCS Æ No (reconfiguration) actions are 
performed on EI, or undesired reconfiguration actions are erroneously 
performed.  
o Time failure of LCS Æ The reconfiguration actions on EI are performed after a 
certain delay (or before the instant of time they are required).  
o Value failure of LCS Æ Incorrect closing or opening of the protections directly 
connected to the failed component is performed. 
• The effect of the failure of RTS (or NTS) on a substation is the same as the failure of 
the component LCS associated to the substation. In the case of Byzantine failure 
these effects can be different for each substation.  
• The effect of a RTS failure on the global EPS may be catastrophic because 
potentially it may affect the all substations located within the region, therefore causing 
disservices to a huge number of loads and customers. 
EIÎII - physical interdependency: when the state of II infrastructure is dependent on the 
material outputs of the EI (the electricity). 
• EI failures can impact on (parts of) the II system by lessening its functionalities (till 
complete failure in the extreme case the disruption is a total blackout of the power 
grid). 
1.2 Hierarchies, compositionality and multiformalism. 
To capture the EI and II peculiarities discussed in Section 1.1, the modelling and evaluation 
framework should possess the following major characteristics, grouped into three categories: 
modelling power aspects (the basic modelling mechanisms required to build the EPS model), 
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the modelling efficiency aspects (the advanced modelling mechanisms required to build the 
EPS model more efficiently), and the solution power aspects. 
1.2.1 Modelling power. 
• EPS is a very complex system having subsystems (or subcomponents) with very 
different characteristics. This heterogeneity must also be addressed inside the 
framework that, therefore, should support the definition of different models using 
different formalisms, each one capable to properly capture the behaviour of a specific 
subsystem. 
• The framework should support the modelling of behaviours and interdependencies in 
a context where the modelled infrastructures have different operation phases and 
regimes with different configurations and characteristics. 
• The framework should support the representation of both continuous and discrete 
states. The continuous states are needed to represent the real values associated to 
the electrical parameters. 
• The framework should support time and probability distributions, and conditions 
enabling the time consuming events (e.g., for the activation of a local protection) that 
can depend both on the discrete and on the continuous state. 
• The framework should support the call to the functions that implement both the II 
reconfiguration and control algorithms and the EI automatic evolution in case of 
events changing the electrical equilibrium. 
• Risk analysis of EPS based on a stochastic approach requires the definition of 
measures of performability, which is a unified measure proposed to deal 
simultaneously with performance and dependability. To this purpose, a reward 
structure can be set-up by associating proper costs/benefits to generators/loads and 
interruption of service supply.  
1.2.2 Modelling efficiency 
• As detailed in Section 1.1.1, the system has a hierarchical structure; the modelling 
framework should support hierarchical composition of different sub-models. 
• The model for the overall EPS could be facilitated considering replication of sub-
models, with and without identification of each single replica. The replicated and 
composed models should share part of the state (common state). 
• Compact representation for the topology of the grid, for example, describing a part of 
the state of the system in terms of a matrix (incidence matrix [nodes x arcs]).  
• Compact representation of continuous state (for the electrical parameters), for 
example, describing a part of the state of the system in term of arrays, associating to 
each component of the EI grid (nodes and arcs) the values of the electrical 
parameters. 
1.2.3 Solution power  
• The framework should support analytical solution of the overall model (if possible). 
Actually, the huge system complexity and its heterogeneity may inhibit the 
computation of the analytic solution due to the explosion of the states of the model 
and stiffness. Moreover, an analytical solution method could not exist for the class of 
models considered, depending on the considered time distributions. Analytical 
solutions may be applied for simpler sub-models. 
• The framework should support simulation, either using general purpose simulation  
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tools or ad hoc simulation software. 
• The framework should support separate evaluation of different sub-models (with 
analytic or simulation techniques) and combination of the results. 
 
1.3 Parameters estimation, validation of assumptions 
Analytical and simulation based evaluation models incorporate parameters and assumptions 
that need to be estimated and validated based on real data. Such parameters correspond  
for example to the occurrence rates and the distributions associated to components failures 
and recoveries, or probabilities characterizing the efficiency of error detection and processing 
mechanisms. Data can be collected from the field or during controlled experiments. 
Statistical processing methodologies are generally used to process the collected data and 
estimate the needed parameters. Both accidental and malicious faults need to be addressed. 
Section 3 of this deliverable outlines the general methodology that is usually applied to 
process the collected data and to estimate the statistical properties of the parameters under 
investigation.  
 
2 TOOLS THAT  SUPPORT CRUTIAL EVALUATION ACTIVITIES 
2.1 Overview . 
We have already analyzed a number of tools that support some of the feature listed above as 
part of the WP2 activities of the first year. We provide here a summary of those tools before 
proceeding to the detailed description of the tools used in WP5. 
We can group the tools considering to whether they are meant and designed for a single (or 
multiple) formalism, and whether they provide a single or a multiple set of solution methods, 
considering that most tools provide more than one solution method (typically some analytical 
solution and simulation), and that it is considered an added value to be able to mix various 
solution methods in a single solution process, so that each component can be solved with 
the most adequate technique. 
Single-formalism/multi-solution tools are built around a single formalism and one or more 
solution techniques. They are very useful inside a specific domain, but their major limitation 
is that all parts of a model must be built in the single formalism supported by the tool. 
DSPNexpress [Lindemann et al. 1999]  , GreatSPN Chiola et al. 1995]  , [Howard1971] R. A. 
Howard. Dynamic Probabilistic Systems, volume II: Semi-Markov and Decision Processes. 
Wiley, New York, 1971  
[Illié et al. 2004]  , SURF-2 [Béounes et al. 1993], DEEM [Bondavalli et al. 2000], TimeNET 
[German et al. 1995a], UltraSAN [Sanders & Meyer 2001], and HiQPN [HiQPN] are only 
some examples of tools based on Stochastic Petri Nets formalism and its extensions. They 
all provide analytic/numerical solution of a generated state-level representation and, in some 
cases, support simulation-based solution as well. In particular, GreatSPN tool includes the 
algebra software package that implements the composition of GSPN models as well as of 
their colored extension (Stochastic Well Formed Net - SWN) [Bernardi et al. 2001. 
Multi-formalism/multi-solution tools can be further classified according to the integration 
support they provide.  
A first set includes tools that try to unify several different single-formalism modelling tools into 
a unique software environment (loose integration). Examples are IMSE (Integrated Modelling 
Support Environment) Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata., that is a support 
environment that contains tools for modelling, workload analysis, and system specification, 
IDEAS (Integrated Design Environment for Assessment of Computer Systems and 
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Communication Networks) [Fricks et al. 1997]  , that provides a broad range of modelling 
capabilities without the need to learn multiple interface languages and output formats, and 
FREUD [van Moorsel & Huang 1998], that focuses on providing a uniform interface to a 
variety of web-enabled tools. Another tool that includes different formalisms is PRISM [Hinton 
et al. 2006] which offer a support for compositionality, but does not allow to specify a model 
using multiple formalisms. A more recent model design framework is the DrawNet Modelling 
System (DMS) [Franceschinis et al. 2002], [Codetta-Raiteri et al. 2006] that supports the 
definition of new formalisms and provides a support for multiformalism and multisolution.  
A second set of multi-formalism/multi-solution includes tools in which the various formalisms, 
composition operators and solvers are actually implemented within a unique comprehensive 
tool (tight integration). Among the existing tools having these characteristics, we cite 
SHARPE [Schneeweiss 1999] W. G. Schneeweiss, “The Fault Tree Method”, LiLoLe Verlag, 
1999. 
[Trivedi 2002], that is a tool for specifying and analyzing performance, reliability and 
performability models, SMART [Ciardo & Miner 1996], that is a multi-formalism modelling tool 
to study complex discrete-state systems, DEDS [Alur et al. 1999]  R. Alur and T. Henzinger. 
Reactive modules. Formal Methods in System Design, 15(1):7-48, 1999.  
[Bause et al. 1998]  , that is a toolbox for the construction of modular tools for functional and 
quantitative analysis of discrete event dynamic systems, and POEMS [Adve et al. 2000]  , 
that is a tool for modelling complex parallel and distributed systems. Möbius [Daly 2001] is 
another important multi-formalism/multi-solution tool. It supports different formalisms like 
SAN, PEPA, Buckets and Balls, and Fault Tree, as well as the composition of models 
described using different formalisms. Concerning the solution process, it supports both state-
based, analytical/numerical techniques (when applicable) and discrete event simulation (both 
transient and steady-state, applicable to any model). 
 
Of the above mentioned tools we hare currently using in the project Möbius, DEEM, 
DrawNET, and PRISM, that we shall describe in more detail in the following subsection, and 
an ad-hoc simulator of EPS that has been built specifically for the CRUTIAL needs, EPSys.  
The criteria that have driven this choice are a mix of the adequacy of the tools with respect to 
the listed requirements, of their availability, reliability and cost, and of the personal 
preferences of the team involved. Although this may not sound as a scientific motivation, 
actually it is: indeed the learning curve of rather complex and articulated tools as the one 
listed above is quite steep and even if you are willing to learn it, the time it takes to master 
the tool to a level of expertise that allows to obtain the best out of it (especially in terms of 
solution efficiency) is not only a matter of time and cost but of expertise (for example it 
strongly depends upon the number of large case studies you have conducted using that 
tool). It should therefore not surprise if the various partners are using the tools they have 
more expertise upon in all those situations in which this choice was feasible.  
The partners (in particular CNR-ISTI) has also developed the new tool EPSys, not because 
EPS simulators do not exist, but because of their cost and complexity. Actually, in addition to 
the difficulties in finding a mature, well assisted and easy to customize simulator for EPS 
systems, we decided to build our EPSyS simulator since our aim was primarily to use it in 
conjunction with the modelling framework under investigation in WP2, for reciprocal benefits. 
Therefore, we needed to have the two evaluation methods sharing the same common 
knowledge and representation of the stochastic models capturing the behaviours and 
dynamics of the entities composing the EPS system.  
2.2 Möbius 
Möbius [Clark et al. 2001] is a multi-formalism multi-solution tool that allows us not only to 
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build models using different formalisms (such as SAN, PEPA, Buckets and Balls, and Fault 
Tree), but also to compose them obtaining a single multi-formalism model, that is a model 
composed by submodels described using different formalisms.  
2.2.1 Modelling formalisms 
Among the available modelling formalisms, here we provide further details on two formalisms 
implemented in Möbius that can support some of the tool requirements listed in Section 1.1: 
the SAN formalism and the “connection model” formalism. 
2.2.1.1 The Stochastic Activity Network formalism 
Stochastic Activity Networks (SANs) were first introduced in [Movaghar & Meyer 1984] and 
then formally defined in [Sanders & Meyer 2001]. The formalism is a generalization of 
Stochastic Petri Nets, and has some similarities to the GSPN formalism. The building blocks 
composing a SAN are places, activities, arcs, input gates and output gates. 
Places in SANs have the same interpretation as in Petri Nets: they hold tokens, the number 
of tokens in a place is called the marking of that place, and the marking of the SAN is the 
vector containing the marking of all the places.  
There are two types of activities, timed and instantaneous. Timed activities are used to 
represent delays in the system that affect the measure of interest, while instantaneous 
activities are used to abstract delays deemed insignificant relative to the measures of 
interest. Uncertainty about the length of the delay represented by a timed activity is 
described by a continuous probability distribution function, called the ``activity time 
distribution function'', that can be a generally distributed random variables, and each 
distribution can depend on the marking of the network. Activities can have cases. Cases are 
used to represent uncertainty about the action taken upon completion of an activity. 
Gates connect activities and places. Input gates are connected to one or more places and 
one single activity. They have a predicate, a boolean function of the markings of the 
connected places, and an output function. When the predicate is true, the gate holds. Output 
gates are connected to one or more places, and the output side of an activity. If the activity 
has more than one case, output gates are connected to a single case. Output gates have 
only an output function. Gate functions (both for input and output gates) provide flexibility in 
defining how the markings of connected places change when the delay represented by an 
activity expires. 
Arcs in SANs are default gates, defined to duplicate the behaviour of arcs in Petri nets. Thus, 
arcs are directed. Each arc connects a single place and a single activity. The arc is an input 
arc if it is drawn from a place to an activity. An output arc is drawn from an activity to a place. 
An input arc holds if there is at least one token in the connected place. The function of an 
input arc removes a token from the connected place, while the function of an output arc adds 
a token to the connected place. An activity is thus enabled only when i) all of its input gates 
hold, and ii) all of its input arcs hold. 
In the following we give some further details on two particularly important aspects: the 
execution of a timed activity, and the measure specifications. 
2.2.1.1.1 Completion rules 
When an activity becomes enabled, it is activated, and the time between activation and the 
scheduled completion of an activity, called the activity time, is sampled from the activity time 
distribution. Upon completion of an activity, the following events take place: i) if the activity 
has cases, a case is (probabilistically) chosen; ii) the functions of all the connected input 
gates are executed; iii) tokens are removed from places connected by input arcs; iv) the 
functions of all the output gates connected to the chosen case are executed; v) tokens are 
added to places that are connected by output arcs to the chosen case. An activity is aborted 
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when the SAN moves into a new stable marking in which at least one input gate no longer 
holds. 
2.2.1.1.2 Measures definition 
Upon completing the model of the system, a modeller has to specify the measures in terms 
of the model. In the SAN modelling framework, the measures are specified in terms of 
reward variables [Sanders & Meyer 1991]. Let R(m) be the rate at which the reward 
accumulated in state m, and let C(a) be the reward earned upon completion of transition a. If 
{Xt, t>0} is the modelled stochastic process and M the set of all possible states, a reward 
variable collected at an instant of time conventionally denoted by Vt is informally defined as 
Vt = Σm R(m)P(Xt = m) + Σa C(a)Iat , 
where Iat is the indicator of the event that a was the activity that completed to bring the SAN 
into the marking observed at time t. The steady-state reward can be obtained as Vt⇒∞. In the 
case in which the reward variable is evaluated considering an interval of time [t,t+l], then the 
accumulated reward is related both to the number of times each activity completes and to the 
time spent in a particular marking during the interval. More precisely, 
Y[t,t+l] = Σm R(m)Jm[t,t+l] + Σa C(a)Na[t,t+l] , 
where Jm[t,t+l] is a random variable representing the total time that the SAN is in the marking m 
during [t,t+l] and Na[t,t+l] is a random variable representing the number of completions of 
activity a during [t,t+l]. 
2.2.1.2 The “connection model” formalism 
The connection model formalism ([Christensen 2001, Daly 2001]) enables the passing of 
results between models, using a database to collect and share the produced results. 
A connected model is a graph consisting of a set of model nodes (called “solvable models”), 
arcs (called “conduits”), and transformation nodes (called “connection functions”). A solvable 
model is a model with a specified reward structure that can be solved, a conduit transfers 
results, while a connection function takes a set of results to generate an input parameter for 
another model. The connection graph is traversed in a certain order. First a solvable model is 
solved, and it writes the results to a results database. The output conduits for that solvable 
model transfer specific results from the model to a connection function. Then the connection 
function performs some mathematical transformation on all the results passed to it, and a 
conduit provides this value to another solvable model. The value is passed into the solvable 
model via a global variable. 
2.2.2 Solution methods and experiment definition 
Möbius currently supports two classes of solution techniques: discrete event simulation (both 
transient and steady-state, applicable to any model), and state-based, analytical/numerical 
techniques. The simulator may be executed on a single workstation, or distributed on a 
network of workstations.  
2.3 The Draw-NET modelling system 
The Draw-Net Modelling System (DMS) [Gribaudo et al. 2005] is a framework offering 
multiformalism and multisolution and it is characterized by an open architecture such that the 
DMS can be customized for the design and the solution of models conforming to new graph 
based formalisms. Further details about the DMS architectural and formal aspects can be 
found in [Codetta-Raiteri et al. 2006]. 
The multi-formalism support in DMS allow the use, in a single model, of different modelling 
formalisms that are used to represent in the most suitable way different aspects of the 
system. DMS also support multi-solution in the sense of a combined use of different solvers 
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to perform the analysis of the model. 
Moreover DMS allows for the definition of new formalisms, and new composed formalisms in 
an easy manner, a feature that we shall exploit for providing a tool support for the Dependent 
Automata formalism defined in WP2  
2.3.1 Defining formalisms in the DMS 
In the DMS, formalisms can be classified as Simple formalisms, Derived formalisms and 
Composed formalisms.  
A simple formalism defines the primitives of a graph based model whose elements can only 
be nodes and edges, with no submodels. At the same time, a simple formalism does not 
inherit any element from a parent formalism (inter-formalism inheritance), except from 
GraphBased which provides the basic elements of a graph. Figure 1 shows the elements of 
the Fault Tree (FT) [Schneeweiss 1999] simple formalism, using a UML-like graphic 
language where each box indicates the name of an element, its properties and the results 
computable on it.  
 
Figure 1: UML-like diagram of the abstract representation of the FT formalism 
Derived formalisms are the result of the application of inter-formalism inheritance; this means 
that some of the elements of a derived formalism are inherited from another formalism 
(simple or derived), or that some of the elements of a derived formalism are defined by 
extending the elements of another formalism. A case of derived formalism is SWN 
(Stochastic coloured Well-formed Nets [Chiola et al. 1993]) derived from the GSPN 
(Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets [Ajmone-Marsan et al. 1995]) formalism which is in turn 
derived from the PN (Petri Nets) formalism (Figure 2).   
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Figure 2: UML-like diagram of the abstract representation of the SWN formalism 
In a multi-formalism model, we usually have a container model and a set of submodels; the 
container model is an higher level model whose aim consists of containing several 
submodels, and defining how each submodel interacts with the others. The elements to build 
a container model have to be defined in a Composed formalism. A composed formalism 
includes several simple or derived formalisms, together with a set of elements necessary to 
connect submodels. Figure 3.a shows an example of composed formalism called FT+SWN 
and including the FT and the SWN formalism.  
DNForGe, the DMS formalism editor, allows the user to define formalisms of any kind 
(simple, derived, composed). Figure 3.b shows a screenshot of DNForGe. 
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Figure 3: a) UML-like diagram of FT+SWN   b) Screenshot of DNForGe 
2.3.2 Building models in the DMS 
In this section, the system under study refers to the control system scenario n. 1 described in 
Deliverable D2 [Garrone et al. 2007] and concerning the Teleoperation function performed 
between a DSO control centre and a substation, by means of a communication network. In 
this situation, an attacker may attempt a denial of service (DoS) attack to the communication 
network between the control centre and the substation. A DoS attack may last for a random 
period of time, and it may be blocked by the success of a possible countermeasure 
(firewalling, traffic monitoring, etc.).   
 
Figure 4: a) Submodel FT1   b) Submodel FT2 
In this section, we provide the multi-formalism model representing the behaviour and the 
failure mode of such system. The model is composed by a container model (Figure 6) 
conforming to the FT+SWN formalism, and three submodels: FT1 (Figure 4.a) and FT2 
(Figure 4.b) are conforming to the FT formalism and they model the failure mode of the 
control centre and the failure mode of the substation respectively; the submodel SWN0 
(Figure 5) is conforming to the SWN formalism and models the generation of requests by the 
control centre, their transmission on the communication network, their processing by the 
substation, the dispatch of the replies from the substation to the control centre, and the 
possible DoS attack to the communication network.  The container model (Figure 6) indicates 
the exchange of results among the submodels. Such a multi-formalism model has been built 
by means of the Draw-Net tool, the DMS model editor  
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Figure 5: Submodel SWN0 
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Figure 6: Container model 
2.4 PRISM – 
PRISM is a tool for the automatic verification of probabilistic systems using model-checking 
techniques [Hinton et al. 2006]. Model checking is a well-established method for the 
verification of a formally-defined system against a formally-defined set of properties. Typically 
in model checking, finite-state systems with nondeterministic transitions are considered (that 
is, without probabilistic information regarding the relative likelihood of transitions), which are 
modelled in high-level languages such as Petri nets, process algebras, or Reactive Modules. 
Properties are usually represented by temporal logic formulae. The aim of a model-checking 
algorithm is to determine automatically whether the model of the system satisfies the model 
of the property.  
Model-checking analyses depend critically on the size of the state space of the system, and 
therefore suffer from a similar “curse of dimensionality” problem as that seen in performance 
evaluation. In the field of model checking, the exponential blow-up in the size of the 
underlying transition system compared to the size of the more concise high-level description 
used by the system modeller is called the state-space explosion problem. Techniques have 
been developed to reduce the effect of the state-space explosion problem on the resources 
(time and space) used by model-checking algorithms: one such technique is the use of data 
structures based on Binary Decision Diagrams for the implicit representation of the system’s 
transition relation and the state sets computed during the execution of the algorithm. Such 
implicit representations give rise to symbolic model-checking algorithms. The underlying 
verification engine of PRISM is based on an extension of Binary Decision Diagrams, thereby 
permitting symbolic model checking of probabilistic systems. 
PRISM can be considered as a multiformalism tool since it allows the verification of systems 
whose underlying stochastic process is either a discrete-time Markov chain, a continuous-
time Markov chain, or a Markov decision process (a process in which nondeterministic and 
probabilistic choice can coexist). Note that the input language for the three cases is very 
similar, but, although compositionality is at the heart of the specification language, 
components have to be specified in the same formalism. 
2.4.1 System description language 
The system description language of PRISM is based on the Reactive Modules formalism  
[GMP] The GNU Multi Precision arithmetic library: http://gmplib]. The language consists of a 
finite number of interacting modules. Each module consists of a set of variables with a finite 
domain, and the state of the module is given by a valuation of the variables. The module also 
comprises a number of guarded commands defining the behaviour of the module. Each such 
command comprises the following elements: 
• A predicate over the system’s variables (the guard of the command), which describes 
the set of states from which the command can be taken. 
• A set of updates, which determine the modifications made to the values of the module 
variables in order to result in the target state after execution of the command, and 
which have each an associated probability or rate of occurrence. 
Furthermore, guarded commands can be associated with actions, which can be used to 
synchronize with other modules, as in process algebras. The overall system is then obtained 
as a set of modules, with the global state of the overall system comprising the current local 
state of each of the individual modules. Transitions of the overall system are obtained from 
transitions of individual modules, or, if modules can synchronize on shared actions, by 
transitions of more than one module. 
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As an example of the manner in which the PRISM modelling language can be used, we can 
consider the example of a simple communication protocol: the model could consist of sender 
and receiver modules, and a single module representing the medium. The sender module 
may interact with the medium module by synchronizing on the shared action send, whereas 
the receiver module may interact with the medium module synchronizing on the shared 
action receive. The medium module may consist of one Boolean valued variable set to 1 
when a message is being sent on the medium, and to 0 when the medium is free. The 
sender and receiver modules may comprise a number of variables, such as those 
representing the current control state, others representing the number of messages in a 
buffer, and so on. 
We note that PRISM models may take the form of discrete-time Markov chains, continuous-
time Markov chains, or Markov decision processes (in which nondeterministic and 
probabilistic choice can coexist).  
2.4.2 System evaluation and temporal logic properties 
In this section, for simplicity, we consider the case in which the model is represented as a 
continuous-time Markov chain, noting that most of the functionality of PRISM described here 
is also available for discrete-time Markov chain and Markov decision process models. PRISM 
offers a number of methods for the analysis of the model:  
• PRISM automatically tests for the presence of reachable deadlock states during the 
construction of the BDD-based internal representation of the model;  
• the user has the possibility to generate and visualize graphically sample paths of a 
PRISM model, which can be useful for understanding and debugging a model during 
its development; 
• steady-state and transient probabilities can be computed; 
• model checking of temporal logic properties can be employed. 
In particular we consider the final item of this list. The advantage of temporal logics in the 
context of formal verification is that they provide a precise and unambiguous method for the 
specification of properties of systems. The language employed by PRISM for continuous-
time Markov chains is the temporal logic CSL (Continuous Stochastic Logic). A typical 
property that can be expressed in CSL is the following: “the system reaches a goal state, 
while avoiding error states, within 30 minutes with probability greater than 0.99”, expressed 
as P>0.99(“error” U<30 “goal”). We note that this property not only is concerned with reachability 
of goal states, but also with the intermediate states visited on an execution path of the 
system before reaching a goal state. Another type of property refers to the long-run 
probability of residing in a given set of states: for example S<0.1(“error”) expresses the 
property that the long-run probability of residing in error states is less than 0.1. 
We note that the two examples of CSL properties given above are assertions; that is, they 
are true or false for a given state of the model. PRISM allows us also to compute the 
probability of satisfying a CSL: for example, for each state of the system, the property 
P=?(“error” U<30 “goal”) evaluates to the probability of reaching a goal state, while avoiding 
error states, within 30 minutes. 
In the examples above, states sets corresponding to errors or the satisfaction of a goal are 
denoted by the propositions “error” and “goal”; for each such proposition, the user is required 
to express the state sets to which these propositions correspond, using predicates over the 
variables of the system model (for example, “error” = proc1=0 & proc2=0, where proc1 and 
proc2 are system variables). Alternatively, the user may write predicates over system 
variables directly in the CSL formula instead of the propositions, for example: 
P>0.99((proc1=0 & proc2=0) U<30 (finished1=1 | finished2=1)). 
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Another way of expressing the state sets used within a CSL formula is through the use of 
CSL itself: that is, we can nest CSL formulae within another CSL formula. For example, we 
may use CSL formulae, rather than expressions over system variables, to express the error 
or goal states in the above example. 
Given an appropriate reward structure applied to the continuous-time Markov chain model, 
PRISM also permits the verification of reward-based properties. For example, the property 
R>3(F “goal”) specifies that the expected cumulative reward before reaching a goal state is 
greater than 3, the property R<=4.5(C<=10)  specifies that the expected cumulative reward within 
the next 10 time units of system operation is not greater than 4.5, the property R>2.86(I=10) 
specifies that the expected reward being gained at time instant 10 is greater than 2.86, and 
the property R<30(S) specifies that the long-run average reward is less than 30.  
2.5 DEEM  
DEEM [Bondavalli et al.2000, Bondavalli et al.2004] is a dependability modelling and 
evaluation tool specifically tailored for Multiple Phased Systems (MPS). MPS are systems 
whose operational life can be partitioned in a set of non-overlapping periods, called “phases”. 
Examples of MPS can be found in various application domains (nuclear, aerospace, 
transportation, electronics, and many other industrial fields). They include systems for the 
aided-guide of aircraft, whose mission-time is divided into several phases such as take-off, 
cruise, landing, with completely different requirements. A very important sub-class of MPS is 
represented by the so-called Scheduled Maintenance Systems (SMS) encountered in almost 
all the application domains where an artifact is to be used for long time and is periodically 
subject to maintenance actions. An SMS is easily formulated as an MPS, for which 
operational and maintenance phases alternate according to a prefixed schedule. CRUTIAL 
offers aspects whose organizion is in the form of an MPS, which make DEEM appropriate in 
the context of the project. In particular, DEEM is currently applied to evaluate Proactive-
Reactive Recovery strategies proposed to reinforce the intrusion tolerance of the CIS in the 
scope of the protection service (see Deliverable D25 [Donatelli 2008a]). 
DEEM supports the methodology proposed in [Mura et al.1999, Bondavalli et al.1999, Mura 
and Bondavalli2001] based upon Deterministic and Stochastic Petri Nets (DSPN) as the 
modelling formalism and on Markov Regenerative Processes (MRGP) for the analytical 
model solution. When compared to existing general-purpose tools based on similar 
formalisms, DEEM offers advantages on both the modelling side (sub-models neatly model 
the phase-dependent behaviours of MPS), and on the evaluation side (a specialized 
algorithm allows a considerable reduction of the solution cost and time).  
2.5.1 Modelling formalism and approach 
The class of the DSPN [Ajmone Marsan and Chiola1987, Lindemann1993] has been chosen 
as the modelling formalism for DEEM. DSPN extend Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets and 
Stochastic Reward Nets, allowing for the modelling of events having deterministic occurrence 
times. Due to their high representative power, DSPN models are able to cope with the 
dynamic structure of MPS, and allow defining very concise models of even quite complex 
systems, through the use of guards on transitions, immediate transition priorities, multiplicity 
functions, rate and impulse rewards, etc.  
The graphical representation of a DSPN model consists of places (drawn as circles), 
immediate transitions (drawn as thin bars), exponential timed transitions (drawn as white 
rectangular boxes), deterministic timed transitions (drawn as black rectangular boxes) and 
arcs. Places and transitions are connected by directed arcs (drawn as lines terminating with 
an arrowhead). An input arc connects an input place to a transition. An output arc connects a 
transition to an output place. Arcs have associated a positive integer weight, called 
multiplicity. Places may contain tokens, entities graphically represented as black dots or 
positive integers. The marking of the DSPN, representing the state of the net, is a vector 
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defined by the number of tokens in each place. A weight (no negative real number) is 
associated to each immediate transition. A priority is associated to each transition. Priority of 
timed transitions is 0. Priority of the immediate transitions is a real number greater than 0 
(default is 1). A firing rate (a positive real number) is associated to each exponential 
transition, representing the random firing delay of the transition whose probability density 
function is a negative exponential. A constant time (a positive real number) is associated to 
each deterministic transition, representing the firing time. Moreover, for each transition, 
enabling conditions (named guards) can be defined in terms of complex expressions. A 
transition is said to have concession in marking if each enabling guard is true and each of its 
input places contains at least as many tokens as the multiplicity of the corresponding input 
arc. A transition is enabled if no higher priority transitions have concession. Immediate 
transitions once enabled fire in zero time. As soon as a timed transition gets enabled, a 
random firing time is sampled from the distribution associated to it, and a timer starts 
counting from that time down to zero. The timed transition fires if and only if it remains 
continuously enabled until the timer reaches zero. When the transition fires, from each input 
(output) place as many tokens as the multiplicity of the corresponding input (output) arc are 
removed (are added) in a single atomic and immediate operation (atomic firing rule). 
Moreover, an inhibitor arc (drawn as a line terminating with a circle at the transition) can be 
used to connect a (inhibitor) place to a transition. They inhibit the firing of a transition when a 
token is present in the input place (or in general when the number of token of the inhibitor 
place is equal or greater than the multiplicity of the arc). Weights are used to represent 
probabilistic choice when more immediate transitions are enabled on the same marking. 
Some attributes of the primitives, such as, guards, rates, firing times, transition weights and 
multiplicities may specified through arbitrary functions of the marking.  
Models consist of two logically separate parts:  
• Phase Net (PhN), which represents the behaviour of the system through the 
alternation of the various phases. PhN contains all the deterministic transitions of the 
overall DSPN model and may as well contain immediate transitions. At most one 
deterministic transition is enabled in each marking of the net. A marking of the PhN 
model represents a phase being executed, and the firing of a deterministic transition 
models a phase change. Notice that quite general structures of the PhN sub-model are 
allowed. In particular, the PhN is not limited to have a linear structure, but it may take a 
tree or cyclic structure [Bondavalli et al.1997, Bondavalli et al.1999, Mura and 
Bondavalli2001, Mura et al.1999].  
• System Net (SN), represents the intra-phase evolution of an MPS. For instance, 
depending on the specific MPS, the SN may include the failure/repair behaviour of 
system components, the operations to be carried out within the operational phase, the 
maintenance activities, and so on. SN-type subnets are only allowed to include 
exponentially distributed and immediate transitions. This constraint is imposed to 
ensure the existence of a simple and computationally efficient time-dependent 
analytical solution. Besides that, any structure of the SN sub-model can be considered.  
Each net can be made dependent on the other one by marking-dependent functions which 
modify attributes of the primitives, such as, transition rates, enabling conditions, transition 
weights and multiplicity functions to model the specific MPS features. A restriction is only 
imposed on the firing times of the deterministic transitions of the PhN, which are not allowed 
to be dependent on the marking of the SN. The attributes of objects like times, rates, weights 
and multiplicities, can be expressed as a function of parameters rather than numerical values 
directly.  
2.5.2 Dependability measures and transient analysis 
In the DEEM modeling framework, the measures of system behavior that are of interest to a 
user are specified in terms of performance variable based on “reward models” [Howard1971, 
Sanders and Meyer1991]. A reward model consists of a stochastic process and a “reward 
 19
Document Title  Page 20  
structure”. Following the same approach adopted in [Sanders and Meyer1991], the measures 
are defined through a reward structure that quantifies behaviours at the DSPN level. They 
are based on a general mechanism of marking-dependent reward functions. Informally, a 
reward structure consists of a rate reward and an impulse reward that are associated with 
the time spent in a state or with some event of the process, respectively. Rate rewards can 
be defined as arbitrary function of the model marking. Measures are further distinguished in 
three categories, in accordance with the time interval they depend on: instant-of-time, 
interval-of-time and time-averaged interval-of-time. The instant-of-time measure represents 
the reward that is associated with the status of the modelled system at a particular time. The 
interval-of-time and time-averaged interval-of-time measures represent the total and time-
averaged reward accumulated during some interval of time, respectively. In DEEM, 
composed measures can be also defined, as a function of the evaluated reward-based 
measures.  
Once measures are defined, the transient evaluation can be launched on the selected study. 
Results are collected in two output files, in formats compatible with spreadsheet programs 
and gnuplot respectively, so as to produce plots or tables of the dependability measures. 
2.5.3 Solution methods 
DEEM currently supports two classes of solution techniques: transient analytical solution 
based on the specialized solution methods proposed in [Mura et al.1999, Bondavalli et 
al.1999, Mura and Bondavalli2001] and discrete event simulation. 
In its present version, the duration of the phases is deterministic and the phase model is 
restricted to contain only exponential and immediate transitions. Moreover, in every non-
absorbing marking of the DSPN there is always one deterministic transition enabled, which 
corresponds to the phase being currently executed. The specialized analytical solution finds 
its ground by observing that the only deterministic transitions in a DSPN model of a MPS are 
the phase durations, and that these transitions are enabled one at the time. Thus, the 
marking process of the DSPN is a Markov Regenerative Process (MRGP) [Choi et al.1993, 
Kulkarni1995] for which the firing times of the deterministic transitions are indeed 
regeneration points. The simulator also supports models where the above assumptions are 
released. 
2.6 EPSyS 
The simulator EPSyS is under development at CNR-ISTI in the context of the CRUTIAL 
project. It is meant to assist the development of the generic, reusable model templates 
capturing the internal behaviour as well as external interactions of EPS entities. Therefore, it 
basically shares the same stochastic models of the two major infrastructures composing the 
electric power system (namely, the electric infrastructure EI and the information control 
infrastructure II), as already described in Deliverable D8 [Kaâniche et al. 2008] of this project. 
Here, the salient implementation modules the simulator is composed of are presented, as 
well as the simulation procedures and some information on its current availability stage.  
2.6.1 Architecture of EPSyS 
EPSyS is an ad-hoc discrete event simulator, described in [Romani et al.2007], designed for 
performability analysis of Electrical Power Systems. EPSyS has been structured in six main 
modules, as shown in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7: Modules composing the EPSyS architecture 
Two of them (ECM and TM) reproduce the EI behaviour. The module ECM implements the 
(electrical) state of the elements of the transmission grid and their failure model. ECM also 
includes the protection system (PM) embedded into EI, which triggers the automatic 
defensive actions after a disruption and the hidden failure model. The module TM 
implements the topology of the transmission grid represented by an oriented graph. The 
modules IIM1 and IIM2 implement the behaviour of II at the two different abstraction levels 
considered. Both these components can be considered like an instance of a generic 
component IIM that supports the activation condition, the reaction delay, the reconfiguration 
strategy (RS) and the failure model of II. If the activation conditions are met, the 
corresponding corrective actions are performed immediately by IIM1 and within a reaction 
delay by IIM2. The component EQ implements the events queue, which allows the whole 
power system model to evolve reproducing the dynamics of EPS. Finally, there is the module 
MOIM that supports the measures of interest. The current EPSyS implementation has been 
developed in Python language, using C libraries for performance critical code. The following 
sections will describe the various EPSyS modules and provides some design notes. 
2.6.2 The coordination: EQ 
EPSyS is a discrete event simulator. The core module is the Event Queue (EQ), which also 
contains the (virtual) clock associated with the queue itself. The EQ module takes care to 
properly serialize the simulation events according to their timing relations. An event is 
implemented with a simple data structure carrying all the information (time, destination, type 
of event, ...) needed by simulation to proceed. A peculiarity of EPSyS is that since events 
cause state transitions of elements, the new state is piggybacked in the event itself. Events 
can be injected into event queue or can be created by modelled element. During it’s lifespan, 
an event will traverse two phases, sensing or handling before being considered elapsed. 
Each phase is characterized by a specific processing delay, and one of two phases can be 
absent. The element receiving the event sees it twice, and it will handle the event according 
with its phase. The status of an event is stored in the event itself, and when a receiver 
processes an event, the event status is updated. An event is considered expired when the 
receiver has fully handled it, including the necessary receiver status updates. An expired 
event is thus removed from the event queue.  
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We can track the event lifecycle through Figure 8 as follows:  
1. The event enters the event queue.  
2.  Events exit the event queue in the correct ordering thanks to the virtual clock 
associated to the event queue itself. 
3. The event is delivered to right receiver by inspecting its destination field.  
4. The receiver is notified, so it updates the event data and performs the event phases 
switch.  
5. The receiver computes its next state and attaches it to event data.  
6. The event processing must be completed later, so it is reinserted into the event 
queue.  
7. Events exit again from the event queue after the appropriate virtual time is passed.  
8. The event is passed to (former) receiver again.  
9. The receiver is notified, it updates the event again, marking it as completed.  
10. The receiver fetches the pre-computed state from event data, updates itself with such 
data, and finally discards the now elapsed event.  
Figure 8: Event lifecycle in EPSyS 
 
2.6.3 The EI Part: ECM, PM, TM 
The ECM module contains the implementation of the simulated grid components. Each 
modelled physical grid component is represented by an element. Each element, in turn, is an 
instance of a given element class. EPSyS has model classes for loads, power plants, 
transmission lines and substations. Each element instance is characterized by model-
dependent parameters (external temperature, maximum allowed load, priority) and by a 
behaviour dependent by its class. For example, a load can sustain overload for an indefinite 
amount of time, while transmission line has limited resistance, and power plants react to 
power oscillations. The modelling of the behaviour of protection embedded in the power 
system elements is implemented as part of the behaviour model of the element themselves. 
The status of EI elements is determined by events as outlined in the previous sections. This 
is also the way the elements interact with each other: they interact indirectly by generating or 
propagating events. For example, a substation will handle a fault affecting it by going offline 
and by generating fault events for all directly attached transmission lines. 
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Figure 9: Communications between EI elements using events 
Figure 9 summarizes this example, as follows:  
1. An event is fetched from the event queue and it is delivered to the receiver (Node N, a 
substation).  
2. The notified node recognizes the received event meaning a fault, so it prepares for 
disabling itself. Before shutting down, the node checks if it must propagate the fault. 
Being a substation, it must propagate its fault to all the attached transmission lines. So 
the node discovers its neighbours using services provided by the TM module, and 
generates disable events directed to those lines.  
3. The node inserts the created events into the event queue, then finally disables itself.  
4. The new events are (instantaneously) extracted from the queue and they are 
propagated to the appropriate lines.  
5. The elements are notified and they disable themselves accordingly.  
The status of EI elements also drives the values of all internal status and performance 
variables that are used by MOIM module (see below). Different variables are attached to 
different element classes; for example, transmission lines never provide any gain, while 
loads provide both gain if satisfied and penalty cost if their requests are not fulfilled.  
The TM module encapsulates all topology information of the modelled grid, being completely 
independent from the ECM module. It provides low-level adjacency information needed for 
flow redispatch decisions, for islands detection, and event propagations. Most of supporting 
topological functions, as the detection of all connected elements, as well as island split and 
join handling, are part of this module. 
2.6.4 The II part:IIM1, IIM2 and the state change functions 
The IIM1 and IIM2 implement the two functions representing the local and global EI 
reconfigurations in charge of the control infrastructure (called RS1() and RS2() ,respectively). 
Both use a state change procedure from the internal EPSyS library. A state change 
procedure takes as inputs the current state of the EI and the current adjacency matrix of the 
EI, representing the available interconnections, and produces a new stable state. An EI state 
consists of the values for the physical characteristics of the system, the most important value 
being the power flow through transmission lines or substations, or injected into grid by 
power plants, or received by loads. The implementation of the state change procedure is 
bounded only by the EPSyS representation of the EI elements and physical parameters. In 
accordance with the literature, the current implementation formulates the new state 
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computation as Linear Programming (LP) problems, by minimizing the differences between 
old and new states, since such differences are perceived as a cost. Therefore, we say that 
state changes are implemented using different cost functions. The implementation of the II 
control functions is based on the following LP problem: 
 min(WoZ +W1( Pi − Pi'i∑ ) +W2( R j − R j'i∑ ) 
subject to the following constraints: 
[d2] 
Pi = R jj∑i∑
P − R = Bθ
F = bAθ
F ≤ Z
⎧ 
⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ 
⎩ 
⎪ 
⎪ 
 
 
This problem has different tunable parameters that determine the cost to be minimized, 
allowing this basic function to be effectively reused in different situations. The parameters 
are:  
• Z is a constant that bounds the difference between any pair of power flows in the grid 
under a given threshold. This allows controlling the spreading of flow through lines.  
•  is the weight (constant) associated to the power flow. The higher the value, the 
higher is the chance of line overload.  
W0
•  is the weight (constant) associated to the power production. The higher the value, 
the less a power plant will change it’s power generation. On the other hand, low values 
let the power production to have great oscillations.  
W1
•  is the weight (constant) associated to the power delivering. The higher the value, 
the less is the chance of a load shedding. On the other hand, low values let the load to 
be shed.  
W2
The other symbols used in the problem are :  
• P is the vector of power flow injected in the grid by each node.  
• P' is the former value of P in the context of state change computation.  
• R is the vector of power flow drained from the grid by each node.  
• R' is the former value of P in the context of state change computation.  
• N is the cardinality of vectors P and R, corresponding to the number of nodes into the 
grid.  
• j is the number of loads in the grid. J<N always holds (also I+J=N holds). j is the 
generic load.  
• i is the number of plants in the grid. I<N always holds (also I+J=N holds). i is the 
generic plant.  
• F is the vector of power flow through transmission lines.  
• M is the cardinality of vector F, corresponding to the number of lines into the grid. m is 
the generic line.  
• b is the weight vector of lines, having cardinality M. High weight means that a line will 
likely carry high amount of flow.  
• A is the adjacency matrix of the grid.  
• B is a matrix defined as A'bA.  
Any status of EI is represented by combinations of values of P and F. There are some major 
behavioural differences between IIM submodules: IIM1 delivers immediately the new state 
while IIM2 stores it internally, simulating a complex computation, and delivers it after the  
delay is expired. This reflects the assumption that the local RS1() reconfiguration 
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implemented through IIM1 is performed instantaneously, while the RS2()  global one 
(implemented through IIM2) requires an amount of time to be computed and applied. 
2.6.5 Evaluating measures: MOIM 
The MOIM module collects various data during the simulation runtime and computes the 
value of measures of interests; data is collected at every state change of the system. EPSyS 
has a fixed set of measures of interest, and they can be computed per-element, system-wide 
or both. Each measure is expressed as a function of the value and the duration of the state 
that each element traverses during the simulation. EPSyS produces a full report of evaluated 
measures, including the final value of each measure, the value of each measure as a 
function of the simulation time, and the time instants corresponding to system state changes. 
EPSyS produces very detailed input to allow to inspect in detail the evolution of the scenario 
and to allow understanding the grid dynamics. Log files are produced, which contain detailed 
state transition for each event and for each modelled element, and can track internal 
interaction between elements. Log files can be transparently compressed. 
2.6.6 The simulation procedure 
The states of the EI are represented by the tuple (Ei,h, Ti), with i=1,2,..., and h=1,2.  Ti  is the 
topology and Ei,h  represents the electrical state resulting from the application of the 
reconfiguration strategy RSh()  on the topology Ti. The main steps of a simulation run are:  
1) For a given topology A and a given susceptance matrix B, the initial setting for P and F 
can be derived manually or solving an optimization problem using the same approach 
adopted to evaluate the functions RS. The initial state of EI is represented by (E0,2, To).  
2) Values of the occurrence times of random disruptions (of EI and failures of II) are 
sampled from the distributions considered for the failure model.  
3) When, in the state (Ei,2, Ti), a random (or cascading) disruption is selected from the event 
queue, the following steps are performed with j=i+1:  
4) The disruption immediately propagates to the neighbour components, based on the 
hidden failure model of the protections, generating a new topology Tj for EI.  
5) The function RS2() is evaluated, based on the electrical state Ei,2 and on the topology Tj.  
6) The function RS1() is evaluated, based on the electrical state Ei,2 and on the topology Tj.  
If the definition of RS1() is based on the result of the optimization problem defined for 
RS2(), the function RS2() must be evaluated before RS1().  
7) The outputs P and F of RS1() are immediately applied to EI (i.e., at the system time of the 
disruption occurrence), generating a new Ej,1 for EI.  
8) The values of the occurrence times of cascading disruptions for the new state (Ei,1, Tj), 
are sampled from the overloading failure model.  
9) The value of the delay tRS2 to the occurrence of the reconfiguration P and F, obtained 
through the solution of RS2(), is sampled from the distributions considered for the II 
model.  
10) When cascading or random disruptions occur (being selected from the event queue) 
before time tRS2, the simulation goes to step 4. With j=j+1 (where the evaluation of RS2()  
is restarted based on the new topology generated by the new disruption).  
11) Otherwise, if no disruption occurred before tRS2, at time tRS2, the outputs P and F of RS2() 
are applied, generating a new state (Ej,2, Tj) for EI.  
12) The values of the occurrence times of cascading disruptions for the new state (,j,2, Tj) are 
sampled from the overloading failure model.  
13) If an halting condition is satisfied (e.g, a total blackout, or a state without cascading and 
random disruptions, or when a pre-determined instant of time is reached), the simulation 
stops, otherwise the simulation goes to step 3. 
Note that the functions RS1() and RS2() are evaluated on the states (Ei,2, Tj), although 
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alternative choices could be considered. Moreover, when cascading or random disruptions 
occur before time tRS2 (step 10.), instead of restarting the evaluation of RS2(), different 
alternatives can be considered, such as performing immediate but less effective actions, or 
even do nothing.  
2.6.7 Availability of the tool 
EPSyS is implemented in a portable way and has no platform constraints. The EPSyS core 
runs in every platform supported by the Python runtime [PYTHON]. The C libraries currently 
needed by EPSyS, GLPK [GLPK] and GMP [GMP] are available as well on all the major 
platforms. EPSyS, as well as the needed libraries, is available for usage after a simple free 
registration request. The sources are available as well on demand. 
 
3 DISTRIBUTION FITTING AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF 
EVENTS 
The stochastic models used to assess quantitative dependability or security measures rely 
on assumptions and parameters that need to be estimated based on real data. Such data 
could be collected from the field or during controlled experiments based for example on fault 
or attack injection. Statistical analysis methodologies are needed to process the collected 
data and extract relevant information to estimate the values of the parameters and the forms 
of distributions characterizing the random variables involved in the models discussed in the 
previous sections. For example, we need to characterize the distributions of the times 
between failures, the times between attacks or repair durations, and to estimate the 
coverage probabilities reflecting the error detection and recovery mechanisms efficiency. 
These quantities correspond to random variables for which we need to estimate 
representative statistical distributions that faithfully reflect the behaviour of the collected data.  
The activities carried out in CRUTIAL in this context mainly concern the characterization of 
attack processes based on data collected from the Internet (See Deliverable D25 [Donatelli 
2008a]).  
Starting from the raw data collected from the field or the controlled experiments, we can 
distinguish three main steps to estimate such statistical distributions and models: 
1) data pre-processing and categorization 
2) statistical inference to estimate parameters values and confidence intervals 
3) model validation through the use of hypothesis testing to accept or reject 
assumptions or the form of the distribution 
3.1 Data pre-processing and categorization 
Generally, the data collected contain a large set of heterogeneous information with a mixture 
of events characterizing the system behaviour under normal operation conditions and also in 
the presence of errors and failures and recovery actions. Data processing and clustering 
algorithms are generally needed in order to extract the relevant information that characterize 
the observed error patterns, their causes and their effects, and correspond to the occurrence 
of the dependability and security related random variables under interest (times between 
failures, times between attacks, etc.). A review of the state of the art and examples of 
common algorithms used in this field can be found in [Siewioreck 2004, Iyer & Kalbarczyck 
2002].  
The application of such algorithms to the collected data will produce a sample of observed 
values of the random variables and events under interest to which statistical analysis 
techniques can be applied to identify the corresponding distributions and estimate their 
associated parameters.  
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One of the concerns that need to be addressed at this stage is the identification of atypical or 
infrequent values among the observed sample that are significantly separated in value from 
the rest of the other observations. Such values, generally called “outliers”, likely correspond 
to unrealistic values resulting e.g., from errors or mis-reporting in the measurement or the 
data collection process. Thus, they need to be considered carefully and possibly filtered out, 
otherwise they might  have a significant impact on the statistical analysis and modelling 
results. 
Various graphical techniques and statistical tests exist for the identification of outliers, e.g., 
boxplot or Nixon and Grubbs tests [Hodge & Austin 2004].  
For example, the boxplot is a popular visual technique that uses the first and third quartiles of 
the observed sample for the identification of outliers. If the first quartile is Q1 and the third 
quartile is Q3, then the difference (Q3 - Q1) is called the interquartile range or IQR. Any data 
observation which lies more than 1.5*IQR lower than the first quartile or 1.5*IQR higher than 
the third quartile is considered an outlier. 
A modified version of the boxplot test has been defined in [Vanderviere & Hubert 2004], 
which is well suited when the distribution of the data is skewed. This test proceeds in two 
steps. 
At a first step, this test computes for the considered data set D a metric denoted as MC(D), 
taking values in the interval [-1, 1], that measures the skewness of the distribution. Positive 
(respectively, negative) values correspond to positively (respectively, negatively) skewed 
distributions, and when MC(D) is null the distribution is not skewed. 
At a second step, the test computes a critical interval that depends on the sign of the 
skewness metric MC(D), such that any value outside this interval is considered as an outlier.  
The test identifies outliers as follows: 
• If MC(D) ≥ 0, x is an outlier ⇔   
 x ∉ [Q1-1.5 e-4MC(D) IQR; Q3 +1.5 e3MC(D)IQR] 
• If MC(D)< 0, x is an outlier ⇔ 
x ∉ [Q1-1.5 e-3MC(D) IQR; Q3 +1.5 e4MC(D)IQR] 
  
Once outliers are identified, then, the question is what should we do with these outliers? 
Different solutions could be investigated: 
1) Remove the outliers from the data set  
2) Substitute them by synthetic values generated based on the general characteristics of the 
sample distribution. 
3) Accommodate the presence of the outliers through the use of appropriate techniques that 
reduce their potential impact on the statistical results, e.g., i) data transformation, ii) use of 
robust estimation techniques or  iii) selection of a subset of the data such that the impact 
of the outliers is reduced. 
The selection of the most appropriate solution depends on the application context. 
3.2 Statistical inference and model validation 
Using the data selected from the data pre-processing step, statistical inference techniques 
are aimed at estimating the characteristics of the probability distributions that faithfully reflect 
the behaviour of the considered data. Different candidate distributions can be investigated. 
Two main steps can be distinguished. The first one is dedicated to the estimation of the 
parameters defining the considered distribution and the second one is aimed at the selection 
of the most appropriate distribution based on statistical hypothesis testing. 
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Various methods exist to support parameter estimation. The most commonly used ones are 
least-squares estimation (LSE), maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and the method of 
moments. Unlike MLE, LSE requires no or minimal distributional assumptions. The MLE 
method requires the knowledge of the probability density function (pdf) under investigation. It 
is based on the principle that the desired probability distribution is the one that makes the 
observed data “most likely”.  MLE method have interesting statistical properties, however it is 
not always easily applicable, especially when it is difficult to find maximum likelihood 
estimators in closed form. The method of moments consists of equating the first few 
moments estimated from the observed sample with the corresponding theoretical ones, and 
solving equations for the parameters.  
The application of these methods generally requires the use of iterative numerical solving 
techniques to find the optimal parameters, e.g., the Newton Raphson method, Expectation-
Maximization algorithm, etc. [Kay 1993]. 
For each considered distribution, the estimated parameters provide the best fit of the 
distribution to the observed data. However, this does not mean that this distribution will be 
appropriate to describe the data. Statistical hypothesis tests are generally used to assess the 
quality of the distribution fitting and to decide whether to reject or accept the assumption that 
observed data could have been derived from the estimated distribution. Examples of 
commonly used statistical tests include the chi-square test, and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test. The quality of fit can also be appreciated by evaluating the residue, i.e., the mean error 
between the estimated values and the observed values of the random variable under 
investigation.  
Several statistical packages that support statistical inference and hypothesis testing are 
available. These include commercial tools, e.g., SAS, SPSS, S-PLUS and also open source 
tools, e.g., R. Indeed, R is a programming language and a statistical computing environment  
distributed under the GNU GPL license. It is widely used for being free and for supporting a 
large variety of statistical and numerical techniques. Also, it is highly extensible through the 
use of packages, which are user-submitted libraries for specific functions or specific areas of 
study.  
In the context of CRUTIAL, the R tool is used to support the characterization of attack 
processes based on real data collected from the Internet. The technical details and the initial 
results obtained are presented in deliverable D25 [Donatelli 2008a].
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4 CONCLUSIONS  
This deliverable has reported on the tools that have been selected by the consortium to be 
used for the evaluation  of CRUTIAL architectural solutions.  
The tools identified will allow the analysis of the architectural solutions in isolation to study 
their correctness and to provide input for tuning their parameters: PRISM and DEEM have 
already been used for this goal (see D25 [Donatelli 2008a]).  
The use of Möbius and the ad-hoc simulator that has been built in the project will also allow 
the evaluation of the added value of the use of the CRUTIAL architecture in terms of 
reliability , availability, etc. of the service delivered by the EPS. 
All models considering the impact of malicious faults  will take advantage of the availability of 
real data on attackers behaviour (collected through honeypot as explained in D25 [Donatelli 
2008a]) and of the statistical analysis applied on these data, so that evaluation based on 
models will be able to use “statistically approved” input data for the models. 
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